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TOPIA 16 5
Robert E. Babe and Edward Comor
Cultural	Studies	and	Political	Economy	Column
Poster	Meets	Innis:	Poststructuralism	and	the	
Possibility	of	Political	Economy
This is the fifth and final column in the Topia series exploring intersections between 
political economy and cultural studies. The column in Topia 15 (Babe 2006: 91-101) 
documents the tendency on the part of mainstream American communication/me-
dia scholars—from John Dewey in the first decades of the 20th century to postmod-
ernist writers of today—to obscure to the vanishing point concerns and methods 
of political economy. The earlier column suggests that “readers should scrutinize 
carefully the writings of contemporary poststructuralist/postmodernist authoritative 
figures to determine just where they stand on issues of political economy” (98). That 
is precisely what we do here: we focus on the American poststructuralist Mark Poster 
and compare his writings to the media analysis of Canadian political economist 
Harold Innis.
About seven years ago, a doctoral student in England suggested to one of us that 
an interest in Innis would make an interest in Poster something of a “natural fit,” as 
their theories are, from the student’s perspective, so similar. From the surface-level 
similarities between them one could conclude that the two approaches are easily 
integrated. Our contention here is that this veneer of similarity masks deep-seated 
differences and revealing contradictions. As Poster is one of the more “materialist” of 
the poststructuralists, the incompatibility of his framework with political economy 
has broader applicability. Interestingly, Poster claims that poststructuralism “is 
a uniquely American practice.” The writings of seminal French theorists, such as 
Derrida, Baudrillard, Lyotard and Foucault, he explains, “have far greater currency 
in the United States than in France” (Poster 1989: 6). If this is correct, then the fun-
damental contradiction between poststructuralism and political economy we posit 
in this comparison gives added support to the evidence presented in the previous 
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column concerning the penchant of mainstream American theorists to dismiss or 
rule out considerations of political economy (Babe 2006).
Mark	Poster
At the core of Mark Poster’s work are the concepts of the mode of information, 
language and poststructuralism. We begin by looking at, and commenting upon, 
these three concepts.
Language and the mode of information
For Mark Poster, every medium of communication, from cave paintings and clay 
tablets to computer databases and communications satellites, “profoundly intervenes 
in the network of relations that constitute a society” (1990: 7, emphasis added). As 
the means of communication change, “the relation of language and society, idea 
and action, self and other” change also (1990: 6). Poster coined the term, the mode 
of information, to designate the consequences of these “interventions,” particularly 
with regard to language (1989: 82). 
He proposes three general stages in the mode of information, each corresponding 
to a particular manner of transmitting messages. In the first stage, occurring in oral 
societies, face-to-face exchanges entail symbolical correspondences because commu-
nicators are conversing about objects in their immediate environs, or as he puts it, 
“the self is constituted as a position of enunciation through its embeddedness in a 
totality of face-to-face relations” (1990: 6). In the second stage, where exchanges are 
predominantly mediated by print, the representational property of language comes 
to the fore and the “self is constructed as an agent in rational/imaginary autonomy” 
(ibid.). This is presumably a consequence of the private nature of reading/writing 
and the concern for depicting through language objects not present in the immediate 
environs and events scattered through time and over space.
The third stage is that of electronics. He affords so much of his attention to this 
stage that he often uses the term, mode of information, to refer solely to it. He de-
clares, for example, “The mode of information designates social relations mediated 
by electronic communication systems, which constitute new patterns of language” 
(1989: 126).
Language, although important in all stages in structuring human relations and 
configuring individual identities,1 is for Poster of particular significance in the era 
of electronics. Electronics brings about such fundamental linguistic change that 
theorizing language is even more essential than hitherto. Whereas in the ages of writ-
ing and of face-to-face communication, analysts (the “grand theorists”) could with 
equanimity focus on actions or activities and neglect language, in our electronics era, 
he contends, social theorists must turn from action to language.2 It is this focus on 
language that defines Poster as a poststructuralist.3
In this third stage, the era of electronics, by Poster’s account, words (or signs more 
generally) cease to represent the outside/non-linguistic world. They instead refer 
chiefly to themselves (self-referentiality of language). Electronic media, according to 
Poster—drawing particularly on Jean Baudrillard—allow or cause signifiers to float 
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in relation to referents, transforming language; that is, the linguistic context within 
which people function:
In TV ads, where the new mode of signification is most clearly seen, floating signifiers 
are attached to commodities.… Each TV ad replicates in its structure the ultimate 
facility of language: language is remade, new connections are established in the TV ad 
through which new meanings emerge.… Floating signifiers, which have no relation 
to the product, are set in play; images and words that convey desirable or undesirable 
states of being are portrayed in a manner that optimizes the viewer’s attention without 
arousing critical awareness. (Poster 1990: 62-63)
And citing a specific example:
The [television] ad takes a signifier, a word that has no traditional relation with the 
object being promoted, and attaches it to that object.… Johnson’s floor wax now 
equals romantic rescue. The commodity has been given a semiotic value that is distinct 
from, indeed out of phase with, its use value and its exchange value.… The ad shapes 
a new language, a new set of meanings (floor wax/romance) which everyone speaks or 
better which speaks everyone. Baudrillard calls the collective language of commodity 
ads “the code.” [T]he code may be understood as a language or sign system unique to 
the mode of information, to electronically mediated communication systems. (1990: 
58)
We will return to Poster’s analysis of the floor wax commercial. For now, the main 
point is that for Poster “representation comes to grief when words lose their connec-
tion with things and come to stand in the place of things, in short, when language 
represents itself ” (1989: 13). This linguistic transformation brings about new patterns 
of human relations, new processes of establishing self-identities and a transformed 
conception of truth and the real. 
Let us consider Poster’s position on these three consequences of linguistic change in 
the electronics era. First, Poster, like Innis, proposes that electronics change the time 
and space relations among communicators: he writes, “the exchange of symbols be-
tween human beings is now far less subject to constraints of space and time” (1990: 
2). Electronics are giving rise to “vast, massive, and profound upheavals” because the 
social world has now “become constituted in part by … a simultaneity of event and 
record of the event, by an instantaneity of act and observation, by an immediacy and 
copresence of electronically mediated meanings to a large extent self-referentially” 
(1989: 9). While the distancing between message senders and message receivers 
began in earnest in the age of print, Poster claims that electronics magnifies that 
phenomenon to such a degree as to bring about qualitative changes in the nature of 
human relations (1989: 128). For instance, in computer chat rooms, communicators 
retain anonymity and can assume and change identities at a whim.
Second, linguistic change in the electronics era affects processes of constructing self-
identities. For Poster, “the self is decentered, dispersed, and multiplied in continuous 
instability” (1990: 6). “In this world,” he continues, “the subject has no anchor, no 
fixed place, no point of perspective, no discreet centre, no clear boundary” (1990: 
11). In part this is an outcome of the exaggerated separation in time and/or space 
between message receivers and senders. But television advertisements are also of con-
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sequence in this regard as they fashion viewers into consumer-subjects “with floating 
signifiers attached to commodities not by any intrinsic relation to them but by the 
logic of unfulfilled desire, which is at once imprinted in the subject’s fantasy” (1989: 
79-80).
Third, as language loses its property of representation, “‘reality’ comes to be con-
stituted in the ‘unreal’ dimension of the media” (1989: 85). Indeed, “it becomes 
increasingly difficult, or even pointless, for the subject to distinguish a ‘real’ existing 
‘behind’ the flow of signifiers” (1990: 15). Poster writes: “The tendency in poststruc-
turalism is therefore to regard truth as a multiplicity, to exult in the play of diverse 
meanings, in the continual process of reinterpretation, in the contention of opposing 
claims” (1989: 15); “social life in part becomes a practice of positioning subjects to 
receive and interpret messages” (1990: 15). 
For Poster there is a distinct advantage to assuming the poststructuralist stance in the 
electronic era: poststructuralism undermines power centres. Every discourse (“grand 
narrative”), and all knowledge systems including scientific knowledge systems, he 
believes, buttress structures of power (1989: 26). The contention, then, is that to 
reduce domination, discrimination and repression of ethnic, linguistic, sexual and 
other marginalized groups, discourses (or what others might term knowledge or 
knowledge systems) must and can be de-authenticated; it is here that Poster links up 
most clearly with Derrida and other deconstructionists.
According to Poster, poststructuralism is just what is needed for de-authenticating 
discourse/knowledge because it asserts that all discourses are inherently self-referen-
tial, and hence bear little or no descriptive accuracy regarding the material world, 
even though they undoubtedly affect mindsets or belief systems concerning that 
world. By denying the possibility of representation, poststructuralists believe they 
countervail power on the part of those who exert power by claiming universal truth. 
Like Nietzsche, Poster insists that “truth is not a transcendent unity” (1989: 15). 
Furthermore, he views the fissure between language and reality as an opportunity 
to be seized in the struggle to subvert centres of power based on claims of universal 
truth. 
It is apparent how Poster could be thought of as covering the same ground as Innis. 
First, both are concerned about the reflexivity of scholarship, about the impact of 
context on the truth claims of theorists. Second, Poster’s “mode of information” 
would seem to conform to Innis’s “biases of communication.” Innis, after all, in-
vestigated the time-space biases of orality, various modes of writing and electronics 
(primarily radio) and speculated on their implications for structuring consciousness. 
For both thinkers, these various modes of communication help establish different 
“time and space relation[s] of communicators.” Like Innis, Poster refers to the flight 
of Minerva’s owl as a metaphor for civilizational change in eras characterized by new 
media of communication (Poster 1990: 81). Third, Innis wrote about “monopolies 
of knowledge” and the related power to control of the predominant media of com-
munication. Poster expresses concern with those marginalized in society and connects 
such marginalization to the mode of information, media, knowledge and control of 
discourses—in brief, to the “representations” through which the marginalized are 
depicted, thought about, interpreted, characterized, discussed.4 
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Despite such commonalities, important distinctions and cleavages between Poster 
and Innis are manifest. Poster is far more interested than Innis in the “constitution” 
or the “structuring” of individuals through various modes of information. Innis’s 
interest is in the role of various media in constituting the organization of societies. 
Furthermore, Poster contrasts language and action, and maintains that linguistic 
change is key to comprehending our present, electronically mediated era. For Poster, 
the only “reality” we now know is of the order of language. Innis would never re-
duce reality to language, although he certainly emphasizes the bidirectional impact 
between language practices and material conditions. Poster proposes that the major 
consequence of media evolution is to transform language—from symbolic corre-
spondence to representation and, finally, to self-referentiality. For Innis, by contrast, 
the major consequence of media evolution is to alter the balance or tension between 
continuity and change, between control through time vs. control over space, between 
diachronic and synchronic linkages (Wernick 1999: 265).
Linguistic transformation?
Undoubtedly Poster is correct that some communication in oral cultures corre-
sponds to the immediate circumstances of the communicators. But it is also true 
that much of oral communication in tribal societies is/was devoted to recounting 
histories and myths which set the ontological framework for everyday life. Homer’s 
poetry depicting the intervention in human affairs of the gods of Mount Olympus 
did not correspond (we now think) directly to the material circumstances of daily 
life in ancient Greece. The Old and New Testaments, likewise, were inscribed from 
oral transmissions, but their mysticism did not always correspond to the warp and 
woof of everyday existence. In animistic societies, each blade of grass is deemed to 
be host to a spirit or deity, again making dubious the validity of Poster’s assertion 
that “symbolic correspondence” characterizes oral society. One might even suggest 
that, due to the importance of legends, myths, superstitions and sacred stories, the 
self-referential (“floating signifiers”) property of language was greater in tribal (oral) 
society than it is today in our largely secularized society.
In Anatomy of Criticism, literary critic Northrop Frye insists that writing is predomi-
nantly self-referential, that it is largely independent of outside factors (Frye 1957: 
17). “Nothing is prior in significance to literature itself,” he declares (1960: 44). For 
Frye, works of literature reflect and refer to one another through their conventions, 
genres, images, archetypes and so forth. Literature is an “order of words,” a seamless 
structure: “The new poem, like the new baby, is born into an already existing order 
and is typical of the structure of poetry, which is ready to receive it” (ibid.). For Frye, 
science is first and foremost a literature and like all literatures refers primarily to 
itself, as opposed to the material phenomena that purportedly constitute its subject 
matters. In The Great Code, published decades after Anatomy of Criticism, Frye argues 
that all contemporary western literature can be traced to the template set by the 
Old and New Testaments (Frye 1982; 1990). Science philosopher Thomas Kuhn 
also denies the representational aspect of scientific literature, arguing that science is 
primarily a socio-cultural activity practised by like-minded investigators who observe 
phenomena through the lens of the presuppositions and prior expectations set by 
their discipline—i.e., their literature (Kuhn 1962). 
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Contentions like these undermine Poster’s assertion that electronics ushered in a 
radically new era. Poster writes: 
The representational function of language has been placed in question by different 
communicational patterns each of which shift to the forefront the self-referential aspect 
of language.… Language [is now] constituted as an intelligible field … whose power 
derives not so much from representing something else but from its internal linguistic 
structure. While this feature of language is always present in its use, today increasingly 
meaning is sustained through mechanisms of self-referentiality and the non-linguistic 
thing, the referent, fades into obscurity, playing less and less of a role in the delicate 
process of sustaining cultural meanings. (Poster 1990: 13, emphases added)
Here Poster agrees that the self-referentiality of language “is always present in its use.” 
The question is whether “self-referentiality” is of monumentally greater significance 
today, compared to the age of print or of tribal cultures, so as to constitute an entirely 
new era. Frye’s answer would be no. 
A related question concerns whether there may be other factors ignored or down-
played by Poster, such as Innis’s historicist concept of time-space bias, that distinguish 
clearly the electronics era from what preceded it. And the biggest question: What 
difference does it make if we accede to Poster’s position rather than Innis’s? 
Poststructuralism as a discourse
An obvious criticism is that poststructuralism is itself “a discourse,” and hence it, 
too, is implicated in structuring/concentrating power. As a riposte Poster proposes 
that by introducing the concept of the “mode of information” into poststructuralist 
discourse, he has lessened the “totalizing” tendency of poststructuralism, rendering it 
now merely a “nontotalizing totalization” (1989: 7). Despite important commonal-
ties, he claims, each of the electronic media (telegraph, telephone, radio, television, 
computers, satellites) requires its own detailed, unique exposition. “There is a mul-
tiplicity of discourses within the mode of information” (1989: 139). The electronic 
mode of information, by covering variegated phenomena, obviates the charge of 
“grand narrative.” But do not the commonalities Poster proposes for the various 
electronic modes of communication (decentring subjects; destroying truth, “reality,” 
authenticity and the efficacy of reason; transforming language into a system of self-
reference) far outweigh their differences, thereby rendering the mode of information 
itself a totalizing discourse? 
Since an important feature of poststructuralism is “to consider the context in which 
one is theorizing,” the theorist becomes aware of and reflects upon “the relative 
importance of the topic one is choosing to treat” (1989: 7-8). In other words, post-
structuralists endeavour to adopt a position of theoretical relativism rather than the 
absolutism of the “grand narrators.” By “connecting one’s theoretical domain to one’s 
sociocultural world or to some aspect of it,” he explains, “one ensures in advance 
that one’s discourse does not emanate from a transcendental ego” (ibid.). Just how 
successful is Poster, and other poststructuralists, in avoiding totalizations emanating 
from a “transcendental ego”? The following extracts from Poster’s work speak for 
themselves:
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The intellectual’s will to power is stashed in his or her text in the form of universal 
reason. The art of appropriating the universal was the main business of the 
Enlightenment. The philosophes were master impressionists whose collective textual 
voice ventriloquized that of humanity but spoke for a particular social class. (1989: 31)
As we bid farewell to the proletariat we must close the books on a whole epoch of 
politics, the era of the dialectic and the class struggle (1990: 130).
Truth is not a transcendent unity (1989: 15).
It is surprising that Poster makes truth claims for his position on the mode of in-
formation in the electronic age given his main argument that language is now self-
referential and has lost its capacity for representation. Poster also proposes that logic 
and reason have no place in our era, which indicates his position is not debatable: it 
is merely a matter of rhetoric, persuasion, presentation. We pursue this point in the 
next section.
Poststructuralism and political economy
Poster notes that Habermas regards poststructuralism as an essentially conservative, 
or right wing philosophy (Poster 1989: 28, 62). Habermas contends that post-
structuralism abandons the Enlightenment, which for our present purpose implies 
that poststructuralism undermines the very possibility of political economy. Poster 
himself states: “Linearity and causality are the spatial and temporal orderings of the 
now-bypassed modern era” (Poster 1989: 90). How can one do political economy 
if language is no longer representational, merely self-referential, and if causality is 
anachronous?
Poster’s riposte is interesting. He asserts, first, that since all discourses, all knowledge 
systems, including scientific knowledge systems, are implicated in power (1989: 26), 
to redress domination and repression, discourses themselves (including scientific 
discourses) must be de-authenticated. Thus poststructuralism is the latest advance 
in critical theory. He characterizes critical theory as an approach seeking “to assist 
the movement of revolution by providing a counter-ideology that delegitimizes the 
ruling class” (1989: 107). Of course critical theory existed long before the arrival of 
postmodernism and poststructuralism; Marx’s writings, for example, were counter-
hegemonic in the industrial age, just as Enlightenment writings were counter-he-
gemonic in the age of faith. For our era, Poster maintains, there needs to be a new 
critical theory accountable to the changed mode of information; poststructuralism 
contributes to critical theory today by “raising the question of language” (Poster 
1989: 116). 
Poster concedes that in the industrial age, Marxist theory, centring on ownership 
of the means of production, was perhaps adequate to highlight patterns of domina-
tion. But with electronics, discourse has superceded property as the primary site of 
domination. In the postmodern era, the task of critical theorists must be to reveal 
these language-based patterns of domination, and subvert them. Hence, the mode of 
information must replace the mode of production as the fulcrum for contemporary 
critical thought and strategy (1989: 106).5 
This position also deserves critical scrutiny. Is ownership and control of media rela-
tively unimportant compared to the linguistic consequences purported to be inherent 
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in new media? (One recalls here the dictum of the anti-political economist, Marshall 
McLuhan, that “the medium is the message” (Babe 2000: 305-06). Poster’s position 
hinges on an affirmative answer, but his evidence is unconvincing. For example, 
he makes much of television advertising’s imputation of nonsensical properties to 
products as an instance in which language loses referentiality in the electronic age. 
There is nothing inherent in the technology of television that requires it to be used 
for advertising or that, if so used, its ads take on the characteristics outlined by 
Poster. Surely those issues are better understood by drawing on analyses concerning 
ownership, control and commodification.
Regarding the Johnson’s floor wax commercial, Poster argues that linking floor wax 
and romance means that “the commodity has been given a semiotic value that is 
distinct from and indeed out of phase with its use value and its exchange value.” 
He continues: “The social effect of the ad (floor wax/romance) is not economic or 
psychological, but linguistic: the TV viewer participates in a communication, is part 
of a new language system. That is all” (Poster 1990: 59, emphasis added). From a 
political economy perspective, Poster’s analysis is naive in the extreme. Floor wax is 
linked to romance in the commercial for the purpose of increasing the product’s ex-
change value; the purveyor of floor wax does this on account of the economic/media 
environment in which it operates. Viewers participate in a language system that is 
rife with political economic causes and consequences.
Similar questions can be raised pertaining to Poster’s discourse on surveillance and 
other aspects of his “mode of information” in the electronics age. Following the lead 
provided by Walter Lippmann’s analyses of pseudoenvironments (Lippmann 1921), 
the phenomena of self-referentiality, simulations, hyper-realities and simulacra ad-
dressed by Poster all point to the increasing relevance of political economy in the 
electronics age. Who is enabled to construct media simulations, why and how are 
they so enabled? What is the nature of these simulations, and whose interests do they 
promote? What aspects of material reality are obfuscated through this approach to 
simulation? Of course Poster claims that we cannot fruitfully address material reality 
at all. But once we, in effect (and ironically, given Poster’s professed promotion of 
reflexivity and his ostensible concern for the marginalized), close debate within post-
structuralist frameworks through the presumption that hyper-reality is “all there is” 
(to paraphrase the old Peggy Lee song), advertisers, PR professionals, propagandists 
and others with communicatory power will have won the day. Lippmann claimed 
that political/economic power accrues to those who can construct believable “pseu-
doenvironments.” Poster’s poststructuralism negates the very possibility of critique; 
pseudoenvironments are as real as we can get: 
In the [electronic] mode of information it becomes increasingly difficult, or even 
pointless, for the subject to distinguish a “real” existing “behind” the flow of signifiers 
and as a consequence social life in part becomes a practice of positioning subjects to 
receive and interpret messages. (Poster 1990: 15)
This self-referentiality of signs upsets the representational model of language, the 
assurance of reason to contain meaning, and the confidence in the ability of logical 
argument to determine the truth…. The electronic mediation of communication in 
the postmodern lifeworld brings to the fore the rhetorical, figurative, performative, and 
self-reflexive features of language. (1990: 10)
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In statements like these, Poster’s poststructuralism, despite its concern for the mar-
ginalized, buttresses existing power and further marginalizes dissent. Who is best 
situated to perform or concoct pseudoenvironments, to use figurative and performa-
tive ploys to persuade? Professional communicators, of course. Who is better able 
to hire the services of media professionals than the wealthy? Marginalized groups 
such as environmentalists may draw on reason, logic, data, evidence and a quest for 
truth as their best defences. Poster relegates these to the dung heap of anachronous 
curiosities. Wide acceptance of poststructuralism would be a boon for professional 
persuaders and propagandists.
In Milton’s Paradise Lost, Satan declares: “The mind is its own place, and in itself can 
make a Heav’n of Hell, a Hell of Heav’n.” For Poster, it is discourse, rhetoric and 
performance in the electronic mode of information that have this awesome power.
Harold	Innis
Poster and Innis are both dedicated to the goal of developing reflexive capacities. For 
both, in the words of Poster, “the problem of communication theory begins with 
a recognition of necessary self-reflexivity, on the dependence of knowledge on its 
context” (1995: 74). For both, a method is needed to critically assess “the authorial 
position of the theorist and the categories he or she develops” (1995: 75). For Poster, 
modernist social science, including political economy, is anathema to this project, 
because the author invariably assumes a position of omniscience, a totalitarian (“to-
talizing”) posture. Innis, on the other hand, never gives up on the Enlightenment 
project and, ironically perhaps, came to view classicism as the starting point for 
developing a self-reflexive mindset.6 Intellectually, the university, said Innis, consti-
tutes “a small and dwindling island surrounded by the flood of totalitarianism” (Innis 
1946: 73). In this context Innis’s communications studies constitute an attempt to 
forge an inherently reflexive social science by developing a political economic ap-
proach in which the concept of bias is prominent. 
Bias
Following his classical studies contemporaries, Innis sought to investigate history 
by placing those interpreting it and their biases at the centre of his analysis (Watson 
2006: 291). Innis’s concept of bias first appears in a pre-communications-studies pa-
per called “The Role of Intelligence” (Innis 1935). It was prepared in response to an 
article by E. J. Urwick who argued that the natural science paradigm was not suitable 
for the social scientist because, unlike the natural world, the social world is inher-
ently unpredictable and ever-changing. This state of affairs, said Urwick, is largely 
the result of the inherent unpredictability of the thoughts and actions of basically 
free-willed human beings. The social scientist is infused with subjectivist tendencies. 
Hence, no human being could truly be objective while examining and interpreting 
the unpredictable subject of social behaviour. “Life,” according to Urwick, “...moves 
by its own immanent force, into an unknowable future” (Urwick 1935: 76). Innis 
challenged both the belief that human behaviour is ultimately unpredictable and 
Urwick’s rejection of the scientific project. While agreeing that much behaviour is 
spontaneous and that human beings (including social scientists) often act on the basis 
of ingrained behavioural patterns involving unreflexive thought, Innis responded to 
Urwick by recognizing that these thoughts and practices are themselves structurally 
conditioned. He called these thoughts and practices “biases.” Innis made an impor-
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tant assertion: while objectivity is impossible, the social scientist can develop the 
analytical tools needed to become aware of his/her own subjectivities, how they are 
constructed and how and why they are unconsciously expressed again and again.7
Here the framework is established for the development of Innis’s bias of commu-
nication. By examining how day-to-day lives are mediated by organizations and 
institutions—how key nodal points of social-economic power affect thoughts and 
practices—Innis understood that the social scientist can develop a needed self-aware-
ness. By identifying these key mediators, Innis thought that the social scientist could 
take preliminary steps in the task of redressing the influences of his/her own biases 
and their subsequent implications for the state of knowledge.
Alarmed by the rapid growth of specialization in social science in the 1930s, Innis 
was concerned that the university was becoming the arbiter of instant solutions 
rather than an essential source of critical questions. This viewpoint compelled him 
to pursue the question posed by philosopher James Ten Broeke—why do we attend 
to the things to which we attend?—and bias was the primary heuristic tool Innis 
developed in response.
Biases are organizational and conceptual orientations most generally expressed in 
terms of two fundamental indices of human existence: time and space. Bias does not 
stem directly or solely from the medium itself but, rather, it is the outcome of how a 
given medium or complex of media is structured and used by already-biased agents. 
In the context of capitalist modernity, a given medium—an institution, organization 
or technology—may facilitate control over space or territory, but generally their stra-
tegic application tends to weaken inter-related capacities concerning time (involving 
duration and sustainability). Radio, television, and now the Internet, can be assessed 
as technologies that, for the most part, have been structured to serve the spatial 
(i.e., “market share”) interests of corporations and, in some cases, states. As such, 
for Innis, contemporary political economic relations are largely sustained through 
the widening and deepening of historically-structured relations involving, in the 
case of commercial applications, the immediate gratification and individualist biases 
normalized through various media. Because bias can never be assessed in isolation 
from the historical, dialectical whole, the deleterious implications for the temporal 
conditions of life—for collective memory, for sustainable practices, for long-term 
considerations—constituted Innis’s primary political concern. 
For Innis, holistic, historical and dialectical ruminations produced a pessimistic out-
look when assessing the age of electronic communications. Efforts to control space, 
as both centring and decentring uses of the Internet later demonstrated, could lead to 
a general and systemically replicating neglect of time. Rather than assessing a given 
medium as itself enabling or disabling some ways of thinking and acting relative to 
others (as with Poster’s affiliation of decentred cultures and liberated identities), Innis 
focused on the balance or imbalance of a given society’s constituent biases. In a way, 
Poster’s political hopes relative to the Internet and related electronic media ironically 
reflect the progressive sentiments of the modernist social scientist as opposed to Innis’s 
pre-modern emphasis on tension and balance. While Innis emphasized the dialectics 
of human action and its limits in ecological and holistic contexts, Poster’s modernist 
bias asserts itself through his focus on individuals and marginalized communities.
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For Innis, time/space biases facilitated by media always emerge or decline in the 
context of historically-structured power relations. Poster’s poststructuralist faith in 
discourse is, in comparison, relatively unreflexive. Poster neglects to mention that 
the capacity to understand biases (including one’s own) entails an assessment of how, 
in any particular place and time, human relationships have been structured. Poster 
focuses on language-related meanings and opportunities in the context of generaliza-
tions concerning modes of information. Innis, in contrast, is more concerned with 
how intellectual capabilities are historically structured. In an interview conducted 
in 2003, Poster argues that consciousness in the emerging postmodern world is 
becoming “especially fluid,” in part as a result of “sites or nodes of resistance [that 
are] decentralized, multicultural, and increasingly globalized…” (Poster 2003: 2). 
Although Poster says he is not an optimist (2001: 144; 2003: 13), compared to Innis 
and other political economists, his work is relatively idealist, in terms of both his 
general sanguinity and his emphasis on ideas rather than of material relations. For 
Poster, information is directly related to knowledge. What one knows of identity 
and meaning is transcribed through experience or autonomously constructed. A 
print-based mode of information imposes a dominant discourse on readers while an 
electronics-based mode opens up prospectively independent interpretations. From 
print enabling “the liberal humanist subject” to electronic media’s facilitation of a 
prospectively self-reflexive subject (Poster 2003: 4), the historical, structural, power-
laden conditions (and for Innis media) maintaining shared truths or, to borrow from 
Gramsci, common sense (and sometimes hegemonic) realities are under-theorized 
or ignored. 
Information and Knowledge
Although Innis affirms the efficacy of material reality, at least in terms of histori-
cally structured relationships mediated by constructed but changing institutions, 
organizations and technologies, his work is more significantly delineated from 
classical empiricism and contemporary positivism through his application of bias. 
Poster takes his critique of Enlightenment thought well beyond Innis by arguing that 
realities (through the structural pervasiveness of ICTs) are being liberated through 
subjective rather than inter-subjective interpretations. In Poster’s back-and-forth 
methodological individualism, informing the mode of information, and implicit 
technological determinism informing the cognitive processes used to make sense 
of information and experiences in his writings are remarkably under theorized. He 
neglects to address the forces, structures and processes involved in determining what 
information and experiences are available and influential. Innis, in contrast, assessed 
these directly, as aspects of the monopolization of knowledge.
Structurally, a monopoly of knowledge implies powerful forces at work in the 
production, distribution and uses of information. In a capitalist market system, in 
which the public service model has been placed at the policy periphery and access to 
wealth is a primary determinant of who gets what information, those with financial 
resources tend to dominate. Such political economic dimensions are not, of course, 
limited to mass media activities; among other nodal points of power they encompass 
scholarship also.8
Culturally, a monopoly of knowledge refers to how information is processed. Ideas 
about what is realistic and unrealistic, imaginable and unimaginable are generated 
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through structured and mediated cultural norms. Such norms are rife with po-
litical economic influences and implications. The paucity of dialectical thinking in 
mainstream Western thought constitutes one important instance of culture shaping 
acceptable/unacceptable ways of thinking. Poster is naive in his claim that com-
munication mediated electronically negates socially constructed modes of processing 
information. He overlooks, for instance, the educational system and the requirements 
of employers in supporting particular ways of thinking and acting. To use Marx’s 
phrase, “the dull compulsion of the quotidian” cannot be theorized into oblivion.
The same electronic technologies that Poster views to be prospectively liberating, 
Innis would have considered apocalyptic.
Intellectual man of the nineteenth century was the first to estimate absolute nullity in 
time. The present—real, insistent, complex, and treated as an independent system, the 
foreshortening of practical prevision in the field of human action—has penetrated the 
most vulnerable areas of public policy. (Innis 1952: vi.)
Following the myth of Prometheus, the application of prospectively freeing technolo-
gies, for Innis, tends to produce tragic results. Addressing the bias enacted through 
the contemporary mechanization of knowledge9 and modernity’s pernicious neglect 
of time, Innis would argue that the Internet accelerates the peripheralization of re-
flexive thought. For Innis, an exponential growth of information and the individual’s 
ability to manipulate it (as in Poster’s emerging “humachine”10) was not the formula 
for a self-reflexive civilization—quite the opposite: “Enormous improvements in 
communication,” observed Innis, “have made understanding [i.e., reflexivity] more 
difficult” (Innis 1951: 31).
Media	Determinism
Both Poster and Innis have been accused of technological or media determinism. 
Ironically, Poster’s emphasis on technological context has been a response to accusa-
tions of “linguistic reductionism.” “My effort,” he writes, “in theorizing the mode of 
information, has been to counteract the textualist tendency by linking poststructur-
alist theory with social change, by connecting it with electronic communications…” 
(Poster 1995: 75). Technologies of information exchange and production were intro-
duced to provide his work with the kind of historical (and dare we say “materialist”?) 
contingency needed to avoid the swamp of idealism. Electronic communication, in 
Poster, gives integrity to the poststructuralist vision of “the self as multiple, change-
able, fragmented” (77). Yet the tendency toward totalization through language, 
although buffered by references to technological capacity, remains. The Internet, says 
Poster, “resists” technological determinist questions because
it installs a new regime of relations between human and matter and between matter 
and non-matter, reconfiguring the relation of technology to culture and thereby 
undermining the standpoint from within which, in the past, a discourse developed—
one that appeared to be natural—about the effects of technology. (2001: 100)
Poster, like Innis, understands a medium as a kind of environment in which some 
capabilities are facilitated while others are retarded. But unlike Innis, Poster neglects 
TO
PIA 16 |
17
to flesh out the power-laden structures shaping a medium’s ongoing history, includ-
ing the biases of its participants. 
But wait. Perhaps, for Poster, the Internet environment itself enables human thought 
and action—enables liberation among self-constituting, decentred “cyborgs”? 
According to Poster:
While there is no doubt that the Internet folds into existing social functions and 
extends them in new ways … what are far more cogent as possible long-term political 
effects … are the ways in which it institutes new social functions, ones that do not fit 
easily within those of characteristically modern organizations. The problem is that these 
new functions can only become intelligible if a framework is adopted that does not from the 
outset limit the discussion to modern patterns of determination…. To ask then about the 
relation of the Internet to democracy is to challenge or to risk challenging our existing 
theoretical approaches and concepts as they concern these questions. (2001: 96-97, 
emphases added)
In other words, only by redressing the Western scientific/modernist narrative 
through the auspices of poststructuralism can Internet technologies be used to gen-
erate postmodern politics. The Internet is assumed to be a decentring communica-
tions system ideally suited for those escaping pre-constituted (modernist) notions 
of subjectivity. As Poster explains, “because it changes the space/time configuration 
of communicating individuals, it changes the social traits of individuals … making 
different hierarchies out of human potentials” (2001: 147). Because the problem 
with the contemporary order centres around meaning and identity, the Internet’s use 
in decentralizing “the apparatuses of cultural production” opens up the possibility 
of a more just, heterogeneous and thus, it is assumed, less oppressive world (2001: 
108). But, importantly, the political step toward this end is not just getting everyone 
“online”; instead, the assumed self-reflexivity of postructuralist thought itself is the 
key. The “ping” of discourse and the “pong” of technology go back and forth, back 
and forth, as one determinant supposedly counters the other.
For Innis, accusations of determinism are also inaccurate, but as a result of his re-
flexive political economy, a complex of structured, biased human relationships drive 
history, not the ping-pong of discourse and technology. 
A typical reading of Innis on the role of communication technology or media goes 
something like this: because they are characteristically durable and difficult to trans-
port, time-binding media include the spoken language, clay, parchment and stone. 
Space-biased media, on the other hand, are light and fragile, permitting wide-scale 
distribution but limiting in their duration over time. These include paper, celluloid 
and electronic signals. For many, Innis’s writings convey a deterministic pattern. 
Time-biased media foster hierarchy, decentralization, provinciality and tradition, 
whereas space-biased media promote centralization, bureaucracy, secularism, impe-
rialism and the use of force.
As implied earlier, such references to societies being temporally or spatially biased 
constitute generalizations only. More accurately and importantly, all biases are 
historically constructed and they are structured into daily social interaction and 
thinking as a result of complex and sometimes conflicting dynamics. For Innis, 
civilizations face annihilation when they are overwhelmed by the unchecked and 
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ongoing predominance of either time or space biases by vested (or class) interests 
who are themselves biased by the very media of their dominance and, tragically, their 
prospective liberation. 
As with Poster’s emphasis on poststructuralism as a method of reflexive thought, 
Innis’s often suggestive mode of presentation arguably involves an effort to engage 
the reader in a kind of dialogue. Innis always took pains to use words such as “em-
phasize” and “implies” when making references to bias. In what might be read as a 
poststructuralist assault on modernist master narratives from the 1930s, Innis feared 
that “the conditions of freedom of thought are in danger of being destroyed by sci-
ence, technology and the mechanization of knowledge and, with them, western civi-
lization” (Innis 1951: 190). The social scientist/critical theorist must overcome this 
institutionalized bias through the re-balancing of scholarly concerns—away from 
the search for concrete facts and toward an elaboration of abstract ideas; away from 
answering questions and toward the task of framing them.
While Innis died more than fifty years ago, we can speculate on how he might have 
assessed the Internet. Surely he would have seen its development holistically and in 
relation to other mediating institutions, organizations and technologies. For Innis, 
the Internet would have been just one of many structurally-biased mediators shaping 
how time and space are organized and conceptualized. In its annihilation of time and 
space, its role in the distribution and exchange of electronic forms of information, 
and its importance in the context of the systemic pressure on capitalists, political lead-
ers and citizens to make decisions, buy commodities and take part in consumption 
activities more efficiently and quickly, Innis would have viewed the biases promoted 
through ICTs and complementary structures as disturbing developments.
We use the word “disturbing” for two reasons. First, the historically and technologi-
cally facilitated bias of the Internet to annihilate both time and space—its tendency 
to impel people to do much more in less time and with little regard for spatial bar-
riers—challenges a broad range of vested interests and other media that tend to 
favour relatively long-term memory or decision-making and/or various modes of 
spatial segmentation. For Innis (as for contemporary Marxists like David Harvey), 
the Internet enables the powerful to extend their reach and control over space and 
perpetuates a cultural and personal neglect of time. A political or strategic outcome 
of this has been a deepening emphasis on controlling space: corporate control over 
markets extending to “relationships” with individual consumers; anti-status quo mo-
bilizations in the form of the so-called global multitude contributing to the neglect 
of ongoing systemic nodal points of power such as labour and the nation-state; an 
intensification of state-mediated acts of violence in a sporadic and sensational war 
on terror that is spatially everywhere. Vested interests such as the labour movement 
or some domestic corporations, and media such as the book, paper currency or the 
nation-state, will continue to influence the temporal and spatial activities and orien-
tations of people. But, clearly, the Internet and related technologies are disturbing at 
least some established ways of thinking and acting. 
The second reason for our choice of the word “disturbing” directs us to Innis’s larger 
concern with how new communication media can simultaneously redress and stimu-
late political economic crises. In its implicit promotion of the short term—itself 
stimulated by the annihilation of spatial barriers such as nation-state borders, which 
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could be used to “buy time” for a culture, an economy, or a government—we already 
appear to be experiencing crisis-deepening trends. These involve the rapid erosion 
of the time to make decisions. Whether such decisions involve the bombing of an 
enemy, the immediate need to satisfy one’s desires through consumerism, or public 
policies concerning social services, the Internet and the general commoditization of 
culture and the value placed on speed and efficiency have set the stage for deepening 
political economic crises. Transnational investors respond to market “signals” with 
spasmodic acts of panic selling, consumers fail to keep up with the demands of sellers 
to buy more commodities more often, and the environmental crisis reaches a point 
of no return while cultures around the world become increasingly concerned with 
the here-and-now.
Innis would not only examine new electronic technologies in relation to a complex of 
mediating dynamics, he would view the poststructuralist preoccupation with iden-
tity and meaning as itself a kind of medium—an academic discourse whose structure 
perpetuates the modernist myth of progress and the ascendant neoliberal meta-nar-
rative. For Innis, electronic technologies and poststructuralist discourses, far from 
“opening a path of critique and possibly new politics” (Poster 2001: 103), would 
probably appear to centralize power by fetishizing the individual and universalizing 
the short-term as the predominant way of organizing and conceptualizing time.
Cultural	Studies	and/or	Political	Economy?
From the outset, these columns have investigated intersections between political 
economy and cultural studies. At this juncture we would seem to have arrived at an 
impasse: despite surface similarities, there are fundamental inconsistencies between 
political economy (as practised by Innis, for example) and poststructuralist cultural 
studies, as exemplified by Poster. The inconsistencies between political economy and 
poststructuralism are attributable, at one level, to Poster’s insistence on moving from 
action to language, and to his persistent claim that the link between language and 
material reality is severed.
Fortunately, this column series need not conclude on a dour note. We would affirm 
with all possible emphasis that there are ample opportunities to integrate politi-
cal economy and cultural studies, some of which have been explored in this series. 
One fecund way of pursuing this integration would be to pursue the question of 
technology and knowledge in the works of theorists explicitly dismissed by Poster 
for being “totalizing”—Habermas, Schiller and Adorno, for example—and others 
seldom if ever referred to by Poster, such as Raymond Williams, Stuart Hall and 
other members of the Birmingham School, Armand Mattelart, Pierre Bourdieu and, 
of course, Harold Innis.
Notes
Many	thanks	to	Topia’s	editor,	Jody	Berland,	for	inviting	these	contributions,	and	to	col-
leagues	for	their	comments.	We	trust	we	will	soon	meet	again	in	the	pages	of	Topia.
1.	He	writes:	“Language	is	not	simply	a	tool	for	expression;	it	is	also	a	structure	that	
defines	the	limits	of	communication	and	shapes	the	subjects	who	speak”	(Poster	199:	
12).
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The	habits	of	social	analysis	run	deep.	It	is	difficult	to	escape	from	old	
conceptual	patterns,	from	the	long-held	assumption	that	in	the	field	of	society	
action	has	priority	over	language.	The	theorists	who	established	the	contours	of	
the	study	of	society—Marx,	Weber,	and	more	ambiguously	Emile	Durkheim—
all	gave	precedence	to	action	over	language.	(Poster	199:	126)
3.	“Poststructuralists	point	to	various	ways	in	which	language	materially	affects	the	rela-
tion	of	the	theorist	to	his	or	her	discourse	and	the	ways	in	which	the	social	field	is	com-
posed	of	linguistic	phenomena”	(Poster	199:	).
.	Jody	Berland,	although	not	addressing	Poster	specifically,	argues	that	Innis	differs	from	
postmodernist	positions	in	two	major	respects:	first,	Innis	does	not	focus	on	representa-
tions	as	do	postmodernists,	and	second,	he	employs	a	more	materialist	approach	(Ber-
land	1999).	As	noted	above,	Poster	is	more	“materialist”	than	most	postructuralists,	and	
hence	contradictions	between	Innis	and	Poster	apply	to	poststructuralism	generally.
The	focuses	of	protest	in	the	1970s	were	feminism,	gay	liberation,	
antipsychiatry,	prison	reform—the	groups	addressed	by	Foucault’s	writings—as	
well	as	other	challenges	to	capitalism	which	were	equally	at	the	margins	of	
the	theory	of	the	mode	of	production	(racial,	ethnic,	and	regional	protest;	
antinuclear	movements;	ecologists;	and	so	forth).	Thus	poststructuralism	argues	
for	a	plurality	of	radical	critiques,	placing	in	question	the	centering	of	critical	
theory	in	its	proletarian	site.	(Poster	199:	106)
6.	Innis	preferred	Plato	to	Aristotle.	The	former,	by	transcribing	dialogues,	preserved	the	
oral	dialectic	in	the	written	form	and	thereby	“opposed	the	establishment	of	a	finished	
system	of	dogma”—what	Poster	would	term	a	“totalization.”	Innis	added	that	Plato	
“would	not	surrender	his	freedom	to	his	own	books	and	refused	to	be	bound	by	what	he	
had	written”	(Innis	1972:	57).	By	contrast,	according	to	Innis,	“in	Aristotle	the	power	of	
the	spoken	word	declined	sharply	and	became	a	source	of	confusion….	The	dead	hand	
of	the	written	tradition	threatened	to	destroy	the	spirit	of	Western	man”	(Innis	1971:	57;	
cf.	Charron	1999).
7.	“[T]he	sediment	of	experience,”	writes	Innis,	“provides	the	basis	for	scientific	investiga-
tion”	and	“the	habits	or	biases	of	individuals	which	permit	prediction	are	reinforced	in	
the	cumulative	bias	of	institutions	and	constitute	[or	should	constitute]	the	chief	interest	
of	the	social	scientist”	(Innis	1935:	2).
.	The	previous	Topia	column	directly	explores	political	economic	dimensions	of	main-
stream	media/communication	research	in	the	United	States	(Babe	2006).
9.	Innis	generally	used	“the	mechanization	of	knowledge”	as	shorthand	for	the	growth	
of	information	(“useful	facts”)	and	the	concomitant	normalization	of	acritical,	unreflexive	
intellectual	pursuits	(“useless,”	unreflexive	“knowledge”)	driven	forward	by	mostly	com-
mercial	and	administrative	interests.	
10.	Interviewer	Stuart	J.	Murray	summarizes	Poster’s	concept	of	the	“humachine”	as	fol-
lows:
You	have	made	efforts	to	redefine	human	subjectivity	in	the	current	context	by	
the	somewhat	awkward	locution	“network	digital	information	humachines.”	
You	characterize	such	“humachines”	in	a	threefold	manner:	(1)	as	evolving	and	
unavoidable;	(2)	as	dangerous	to	yet	at	the	same	time	resources	for	power;	and	
(3)	as	sites	or	nodes	of	resistance….	(Poster	2003:	2)
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